Title: Section 24(2): Does the truth cost too much? by Pearn, Matthew
T it l e : S e c t io n  2 4 (2 ):  D o es  th e  t r u t h  c o st  t o o  m u c h ?
Matthew Peam*
“Truth, like all other good things, may be loved unwisely -  
may be pursued too keenly -  
may cost too much. ”l
The Supreme Court of Canada in its 2009 Grant trilogy2 significantly shifts the 
Canadian rationale for excluding probative evidence from a criminal trial when a state 
actor has breached a defendant’s constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Charter? 
The majority decision from R v Grant has broadened the trial judge’s discretion to 
either exclude or include evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter in this new test 
for determining when a criminal investigation may bring the system of justice into 
disrepute.4 In rewriting the test for Charter exclusion, the Court has abandoned the 
requirement that trial judges protect the fairness of the criminal trial by automatically 
excluding both conscripted testimony from the criminally accused and any otherwise 
non-discoverable evidence uncovered through police investigations arising from 
comments made during the forced testimony.5 Trial judges may now accept into the 
record otherwise undiscoverable derivative physical evidence collected by police and 
the Crown may now attempt to use this evidence in its prosecutions.6 The Charter 
remedy of exclusion which had, prior to Grant, barred this evidence also supported 
the expectation that the Crown bear the burden of proving its own case and respected
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the principle that the state cannot force the criminally accused to self-incriminate. This 
created a balance of power between the criminally accused and the state which may be 
upset if Grant is applied in a fashion that regularly allows certain kinds of evidence to 
be admitted into the trial record.
While Grant rejects large swaths of the section 24(2) jurisprudence, the Court 
views its re-imagining of the Charter exclusion remedy as more revisionary than 
revolutionary.7 As Justice David Doherty of the Ontario Court of Appeal observed, 
in Grant the Court has taken a judicial “wire brush to the 20 years of jurisprudential 
gloss that had built up around s.24(2) and scrubbed down to the bare words of the 
section.”8 The Court’s goal in Grant is to create a remedy of exclusion which better 
respects the text of section 24(2), while simultaneously placing a renewed emphasis 
upon the truth-seeking function of the court and the public’s interest in adjudication 
on the merits. Grant resets the law, freeing trial judges to include or exclude any 
evidence obtained through a Charter breach if doing so will best protect the long­
term reputation of Canada’s administration of justice. The Grant majority emphasized 
appellate deference to this inherently factual inquiry, which requires a judge to consider 
whether in all the circumstances of each individual case the exclusion of evidence is 
the appropriate remedy.9
The Grant test overrules the earlier dictum from Stillman where whole 
categories of illegally obtained evidence were presumptively excluded in order to 
ensure that a criminal defendant would receive a fair trial.10 Grant re-affirms the more 
traditional truth-seeking preference of the courts to exclude untrustworthy forced 
testimonial evidence and to thoroughly scrutinize all improperly collected physical 
evidence of probative value before excluding it. This distinction was partly lost in the 
Stillman definition of conscriptive evidence, and even trivial conscription was treated 
as an absolute bar upon entering evidence into the trial record. Grant improves upon 
Stillman by better respecting the section 24(2) goal of examining, in the totality of 
circumstances, whether the admission of evidence would bring the system of justice into 
long-term disrepute. In particular, it focuses upon whether police have demonstrated 
good faith in attempting to comply with the Charter rights of the criminally accused.
However, this focus upon good faith policing standards comes at the expense 
of any direct examination into whether the fairness of our adversarial criminal 
prosecutions has been upset by admitting improperly collected evidence. The Court in
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Grant appropriately identified that the reputation of the justice system will be harmed 
if trial judges are seen to support police abuse of constitutionally protected rights, but 
as courts generally presume that police carry out their duties in good faith, it is likely 
that trial judges will fail to consistently apply this check on state power.11 Trial fairness 
and its rules, which are favourable to the criminally accused, impeded the successful 
prosecution of criminals in order to limit state power and created a measure of balance 
between the state and the criminally accused.12 This balance required that certain 
kinds of evidence must be presumptively (if not absolutely) excluded, because the 
state should not be able to use its limitless resources to force the criminally accused to 
participate in his or her own conviction. If state power goes unchecked in this regard, 
this too will, in the long-term, diminish the reputation of Canada’s administration of 
justice. As the public will only accept the correctness of decisions rendered by a justice 
system which assures that the public’s rights are valued by the state, the important and 
multifaceted concept of trial fairness provided guidance upon when to use the remedy 
of exclusion to correct an abuse of state power. The Court in Grant abandoned the 
expectation that trial judges explicitly consider trial fairness at the price of precision in 
when evidence should be excluded.
In stripping section 24(2) back to its bare text, the Court in Grant 
simultaneously unsettled the law and ignored the historic purpose of this exclusion 
remedy. The Court further re-opened the possibility of admitting probative evidence 
which the drafters of section 24(2) intended to see excluded from the trial record. 
The Court in Grant properly affirmed the broad discretion of trial judges to exclude 
evidence when necessary, and denounced the historic injustice created by preventing 
judges from excluding evidence except in those rare situations where “the allowance 
of evidence [was] gravely prejudicial to the accused, [its] admissibility [was] tenuous 
and [its] probative force ... trifling”.13 However, in resettling the remedy of exclusion, 
the Court overlooked that this Charter discretion was created in order to ensure that 
all who are criminally accused receive a fair trial.14 Following Grant, uncertainty and 
imprecision in the outcome of section 24(2) applications will be the rule until new 
“patterns ... emerge with respect to particular types of evidence”, providing guidance 
to judges in future cases.15 While in the short-term judges seem inclined to use their 
broad discretion to exclude a great deal of evidence,16 the structure of the new section 
24(2) test may allow for an easy swing to either extreme. Further, in directing the trial
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judge to uphold the truth-seeking institution of the courts without reference to the 
necessary counterpoint of trial fairness, the Court in Grant tips the balance too far in 
favour of truth over justice.
The approach from Grant inferentially accepts that where the court fails to 
exclude evidence in the face of a Charter breach, a trial judge may avoid bringing 
the administration of justice into further disrepute by simply declaring that a Charter 
breach has occurred. The drafters of Charter sections 24(1) and (2) explicitly rejected 
declaratory remedies of this kind as an appropriate response to a Charter breach.17 
Moreover, Canada’s courts have suggested that Charter section 24, as a whole, is a tool 
intended to “help fulfil the realization of our constitutional ideals”.18 These sections 
should be understood as a “sincere attempt on the part of society to provide full and 
adequate remedies for the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms [because to] 
have a right or freedom without an adequate remedy is to have a right or freedom in 
theory only -  a hollow or empty right.”19 As section 24(2) interpretation under Grant 
will undoubtedly leave many criminally accused without a remedy for rights highly 
valued in Canadian society, the repute of the justice system will remain tarnished when 
no substantial remedy is open to a criminally accused. If Canada’s courts are to protect 
the long-term reputation of the administration of justice, trial judges must possess 
some other remedy for when the exclusion of evidence cannot be justified.
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) is considering alternative Charter 
remedies under section 24(1) and it must develop these alternatives in order to rein in 
government abuse and to ensure respect for Charter rights. The Court must also create 
a better remedial scheme in order to ensure that trial judges do not overly rely upon 
their new, broad discretion to exclude evidence under section 24(2).20 As the SCC 
recently acknowledged in Vancouver v Ward, courts may legitimately grant Charter 
remedies to deter future Charter breaches.21 In failing to develop an appropriate 
alternative remedy to section 24(2) exclusion, we will leave many whose rights are 
breached without a remedy and will generally undermine the value of Charter rights 
belonging to society at large, perhaps legitimizing future state abuse of these rights. 
Until the appropriate alternatives to the remedy of exclusion are developed, it can be 
appropriately asked: does our court’s search for the truth cost too much?
♦ ♦ ♦
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Grant dissolves the much loathed categories of conscripted and non­
conscripted evidence in favour of examining whether, in all the circumstances 
involved in the collection of probative evidence, any evidence regardless of its status 
as conscribed or non-conscribed should be excluded. While the Court recognized 
that forced confessions are almost certainly excluded,22 it abandoned any concern for 
whether real evidence was discovered by police as a consequence of forced testimony 
from the criminally accused.23 Most notably the Court erases the trial fairness principle 
from its section 24(2) analysis, and eliminates the presumption that non-discoverable 
evidence derived from forced testimony must be excluded.24 In making these changes, 
Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin and Justice Louise Charron for the Grant majority 
have overlooked the history surrounding the creation of section 24(2), and ignored 
the contents of the ruling of Justice Ronald Martland in R v Wray, which the Charter 
drafters intended to correct. Examining the history, it becomes plain that section 24(2) 
was embedded into the Charter specifically to limit police abuses like those committed 
against John Wray, and to protect the criminally accused where non-discoverable 
evidence derived from his conscripted testimony would otherwise be used in assuring 
his conviction.
Canadian Parliament began drafting and considering section 24(2) of the 
Charter at a time when common law authority denied a trial judge the discretion 
to exclude otherwise reliable evidence presented by the Crown in a criminal trial, 
even though police in obtaining that evidence acted in a way that could bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. In the 1970s, the SCC had freshly adopted 
common law authority from England which strongly endorsed the truth-seeking 
function of the court in this regard.25 However, the perception that the common law 
courts are ultimately a truth-seeking establishment focused on obtaining the most 
accurate outcome likely influenced the Canadian jurists’ decision to accept this 
standard. Despite this perception, common law courts had for some time allowed for 
exclusion of probative evidence in support of the greater public good. During the 
late 18th and early 19th centuries, English jurist and law reformer Jeremy Bentham 
campaigned to have courts enhance their truth-seeking function by examining many 
categories of evidence that were traditionally excluded. Bentham argued that the 
common law exclusion of evidence was “an extreme and a most disastrous remedy” 
because it was “more likely to lead to misdecision through its exclusion of relevant 
evidence.”26 In Bentham’s view, to exclude evidence was to exclude justice.
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Despite this concern, both Bentham and 20th century legal scholar John 
Henry Wigmore understood that the purpose of a trial may be something more than 
simply a search for truth. Bentham argued that the proper purpose of substantive 
law is utilitarian: it ensures “the preservation of the greatest happiness to the greatest 
number.”27 Bentham recognized that the admissibility of some evidence could come at 
too high a price if doing so allowed a general injustice to prevail.28 In a similar vein, 
Wigmore acknowledged that there exists legitimate societal reasons for interfering 
with the fact-finding ability of the courts. Wigmore labelled these reasons as “extrinsic 
policies” which:
...forbid the admission o f various sorts o f evidence because some 
consideration extrinsic to the investigation o f truth is regarded as more 
important and overpowering... [TJheir effect is to obstruct not to facilitate 
the search for truth, and... this effect is consciously accepted as less harmful 
on the whole than the extrinsic disadvantages which would ensue to other 
interest o f society if  no such limitations existed.29
Wigmore listed a number of examples of extrinsic policy choices which 
exclude evidence. Courts have recognized society’s interest in certain zones of privacy 
by respecting litigation privilege, marital privilege and physician-patient privilege.30 
Underlying both Wigmore and Bentham’s philosophies is a common belief that there 
must be a balancing of society’s interests between individual rights and the truth- 
seeking function of the court. This balancing precludes the simple application of law 
to facts in order to achieve justice.
In his text on the theoretical understanding of evidence law, H. L. Ho references 
the work of Harvard law professor and prominent American litigator Charles Rothwell 
Nesson who explains that the moral dilemma involved in the admission or exclusion 
of tainted evidence at trial remains a live question in the 21st century. Nesson asks:
Should the search for truth ever be compromised to enhance the acceptability 
o f verdicts and thus the power o f the law’s substantive message? Should 
the appearance o f justice ever be more important than actual justice? ... To 
argue that the search for truth may be compromised in order to enhance 
the power o f the law’s substantive message is to force us to confront an 
unsettling choice and to make an argument that is in some sense inherently 
unsatisfying.31
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid at 98.
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Ho identifies the subtext of Nesson’s message as saying that the primary aim 
of the justice system is to secure public acceptance of verdicts. However, Ho says 
that de facto public acceptance of a trial verdict should not be treated as an end in 
itself. Rather than focussing on mere public acceptance of a decision, he says we 
should focus on the acceptability of the reasoning that supports the verdict. This 
will sometimes mean doing justice to the individual criminally accused in a way 
that the public, including the direct victims of a criminal act, may find “inherently 
unsatisfying”.32 As Manitoba’s Chief Justice Samuel Freedman wrote, not long after 
Wray, the policy choice to limit truth-seeking in favour of a greater justice helps to 
ensure public acceptance of the court’s decisions in general:
The objective of a criminal trial is justice. Is the quest of justice synonymous 
with the search for truth? In most cases, yes. Truth and justice will emerge 
in a happy coincidence. But not always. Nor should it be thought that the 
judicial process has necessarily failed if justice and truth do not end up in 
perfect harmony. Such a result may follow from law’s deliberate policy.
... [T]he law makes its choice between competing values and declares it is 
better to close the case without all the available evidence being put on the 
record. We place a ceiling price on truth. It is glorious to possess, but not at 
an unlimited cost.33
By this logic it follows that when courts properly administer justice by 
guaranteeing all criminally accused a fair trial, the general public will be more inclined 
to accept the substantive message that the courts’ verdicts are generally valid. Where 
courts fail to ensure trial fairness between the state and the accused, likewise the 
general public will be inclined to see trials as possible miscarriages of justice.
The SCC was confronted with Ho’s “unsettling choice” between the 
substantive message of the law and the search for truth in Grant and earlier in 
Stillman, Collins and Wray. The Court’s goal in these decisions was to guide judges in 
determining when exclusion or inclusion of evidence would best ensure the public’s 
acceptance of verdicts and thus protect the repute of the Canadian justice system. The 
Canadian Parliament and provincial legislatures’ choice to create constitutional rights 
and the constitutional remedy of exclusion instructs the courts that the unreasonably 
high common law standard of excluding only evidence collected in a manner which 
“shocks the conscience” of the community is a standard too high for the valued rights 
enshrined within the Charter.34 Under the Charter-cra standard, if a trial judge finds 
that failing to distance the court from the inappropriate actions of a state officer may
Press Inc., 2008) at 59.
32 Ib id  2X60.
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tarnish the long-term reputation of justice, the trial judge must exclude evidence 
connected to those actions. The content of what informs this standard is found, in part, 
from the history related to its creation.
In the years leading up to the incorporation of the Charter into Canada’s 
constitution, Canadian courts found little reason to exclude evidence of solid probative 
value in order to maintain the abstract principle of trial fairness or to protect the repute 
of justice. Rather, the fairness of a trial would only be compromised by “the admission 
of evidence the probative value of which [was] outweighed by its prejudicial effect.”35 
The SCC’s 1971 decision, R v Wray, defined the common law rule for exclusion of 
illegally obtained evidence.36 In adopting an English standard from Kuruma v R, the 
SCC decided to “turn a blind eye to the manner in which the evidence was obtained” 
and rejected “fairness to the accused” and “protection of the integrity of the judicial 
process” as reasons for excluding evidence.37 The Court accepted this principle in the 
face of blatant police abuse of the criminally accused’s rights, where police used state 
power to collect evidence key to the Crown’s case against the defendant.
John Wray was arrested by Ontario Provincial Police on 4 June, 1968 in 
connection with a murder. During Wray’s nine-hour interrogation, the police denied 
Wray access to his lawyer despite the fact that his lawyer had called the police station 
searching for Wray. After obtaining a confession from Wray, the police ordered him 
to guide them to the rifle Wray had used in the killing. Wray had thrown the rifle into 
a swamp some 15 miles from the murder scene.38 The Crown’s case relied heavily on 
the probative value of the confession and the weapon as there was no eye witness to 
the crime.
At Wray’s trial, the judge excluded both the confession and the weapon 
from consideration, believing that to enter this evidence would render Wray’s trial 
unfair. At the Ontario Court of Appeal, Justice Aylesworth wrote for the majority 
saying that the trial judge had the discretion to reject the evidence regardless of its 
substantial importance to the prosecution’s case should the trial judge believe that 
admitting it would “be unjust or unfair to the accused or...bring the administration 
of justice into disrepute.”39 In reversing the lower courts, Justice Martland writing 
for the SCC majority ruled that the trial judge could not grant Wray the remedy of 
excluding the illegally obtained probative physical evidence merely because the 
trial judge believed that the evidence might deny Wray a fair trial and thus bring the
35 Alan W. Bryant, Sidney N. Lederman & Michelle K. Fuerst, The Law of Evidence in Canada, 3d ed 
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2009) at 566 [Sopinka].
36 Wray, supra note 13.
37 Evidence and the Charter, supra note 17 at 201.
38 Wray, supra note 13 at 300.
39 R v Wray, [1970] 2 OR 3, 3 CCC 122 at 123 (Ont CA).
“administration of justice into disrepute.”40 If Wray was entitled to any remedy, it 
would have to be found in the narrowly construed Canadian Bill o f  Rights in a separate 
civil proceeding.41 Probative evidence needed to be admitted at trial in order to ensure 
that the trial judge rendered the proper verdict. Meanwhile, in dissent, Chief Justice 
John Robert Cartwright reasoned that because there exists a common law right against 
self-incrimination, both the confession and the derivative physical evidence needed to 
be excluded. Chief Justice Cartwright said the physical evidence should be excluded 
because the accused had been conscripted into assisting the Crown in discovering the 
location of the weapon.
Following Wray, the courts were not inclined to resurrect any prior common 
law discretion to exclude evidence based upon a sense of “fairness to the accused” 
or in “protection of the integrity of the judicial process”.42 In response, Parliament 
initially attempted to soften the common law through legislation. In enacting 
provisions authorizing a warrant scheme for wiretapping, Parliament gave the court 
permission to exclude evidence where the “admission [of the evidence] would bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute.”43
Wray prompted further consideration of a broader exclusionary remedy from 
the Law Reform Commission of Canada.44 Commissioners working on the project 
included future Supreme Court of Canada Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, a man whose 
later reforms to Canadian criminal law were defined by his careful balancing of the 
“relative values of truth and justice.”45 Commissioner Lamer’s understanding of trial 
fairness was formed in part by his work as a Quebec criminal defence lawyer during 
the Duplessis era.46 Lamer saw how police used interrogation and other investigative 
techniques to conscript a criminally accused into assisting the Crown’s case.47 He 
feared that the state’s unrestrained use of criminal law could easily become a tool 
for political oppression, and was “deeply affected by [the] injustices of the system”
40 Wray, supra note 13 at 287.
41 Evidence and the Charter, supra note 17 at 203.
42 Ibid at 201, 202.
43 Ibid at 202.
44 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence, (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), s 15.
45 Patrick Healy, “Lamer, the Exclusion o f Evidence and the Scent of Truth 1975-2000” in Adam Dodek, 
Daniel Jutras, eds, The Sacred Fire: The Legacy o f Antonio Lamer (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2009) 177 at 
203 [Healy],
46 Jula Hughes, “Control of Process: The Criminal Procedure Jurisprudence of Chief Justice Lamer” in 
Adam Dodek, Daniel Jutras, eds, The Sacred Fire: The Legacy o f Antonio Lamer (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 
2009) 151 at 153 [Hughes],
47 Healy, supra note 45 at 178.
common to the time.48 He felt that judges must have the discretion to exclude evidence 
at trial in order to control these abuses.49
At the same time, Lamer and his fellow commissioners said that in our 
adversarial trial system, “judicial impartiality also place[s] restraints upon the degree 
of control the judiciary can exercise over the conduct of the prosecution.”50 Judges 
cannot simply become the champions of civil rights because to do so “would imperil 
the impartiality of our courts.”51 In the Commission’s view, judges must be granted the 
discretion to restrain systemic abuses of the criminal justice system, but must not be 
granted a discretion so broad as to become partial. For this reason, the Commission 
favoured rules governing trials which would only act as “a check on the otherwise 
limitless powers of the state, its institutions and officials.”52 The rights of individuals 
came second to the restraint of power.
This idea of levelling the playing field and the obligation of the state to 
deliver trial fairness in its prosecutions animated much of Chief Justice Lamer’s later 
work. His understanding of the Crown’s obligation to bring a case to meet (burden of 
proof), the presumption of innocence, the right to silence, and the principle against 
self-incrimination operate together to limit state power and protect the integrity of the 
administration of justice. As he would later say:
...perhaps the single most important organizing principle in criminal law 
is the right o f an accused not to be forced into assisting in his or her own 
prosecution’ -  the “case to meet” principle. This principle... is perhaps best 
described in terms o f the overarching principle against self-incrimination, 
which is firmly rooted in the common law and is a fundamental principle 
of justice ...53
In its Report on the Law o f Evidence (1975) the Commission in response 
to Justice Maitland’s decision in Wray recommended that judges should have a 
discretionary power to exclude evidence obtained in such a manner that its admission 
would tend to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.54 The Commission’s 
prQ-Charter report joined others which also recommended that this remedy of 
exclusion be granted to trial judges, but both the provinces and civil rights activists 
were concerned with how courts might apply this discretion. Provinces worried that the
48 Hughes, supra note 46 at 153.
49 Ibid.
50 Control o f Process, supra note 12 at 22.
51 Ibid at 28.
52 Ibid A l l .
53 R v S (RJ), [1995] 1 SCR 451 at 469.
54 Sopinka, supra note 35 at 550.
exclusionary power would be used as a mandatory rule which would remedy even the 
most minor or technical civil rights breaches, as was commonly done in the American 
prosecutions.55 Conversely, civil libertarians worried that the courts would choose not 
to use an unfocused discretion to overrule the precedent set in Wray.56 Meanwhile, 
the McDonald Commission in its investigation into illegal acts committed by RCMP 
officers recommended that Parliament compromise between the two positions and 
legislate a limited exclusionary discretion like the one recommended by the Law 
Reform Commission.57
The earliest draft versions of a unified section 24 of the Charter would have 
restricted Charter remedies to declarations, injunctions, prerogative writs and would 
also have inhibited the court’s ability to create new remedies for Charter breaches.58 
In the end Parliament settled on a two-part enforcement clause, where section 24(2) 
was to “reflect an intent on the part of the framers to erect a half-way house that was an 
improvement on the common law rule but without the excess of the American rule.”59 
Section 24(1) and (2) read as follows:
Enforcement of Guaranteed Rights and Freedoms
24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, 
have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction 
to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances.
Exclusion of evidence bringing administration of justice into disrepute
24. (2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that 
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or 
freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it 
is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission 
of it in the proceedings would bring the administration o f justice into 
disrepute.
The purpose of the section 24(2) exclusion remedy was explored by the 
SCC in the 1987 case, R v Collins.60 The appellant, Ruby Collins, was arrested by 
Vancouver police for possession of heroin. During her arrest a police officer seized
55 Evidence and the Charter, supra note 17 at 207-211.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid at 203, 204.
58 /6 « /at 218.
59 Ibid at 218.
60 R v Collins, [1987] 1 SCR 265, 33 CCC (3d) 1 [Collins].
her by the throat, administering a hold intended to prevent Collins from swallowing 
a balloon containing heroin. After pulling Collins to the floor and before giving her a 
reading of her rights the police officer noticed she was clenching one of her hands. He 
ordered Collins to show him what she was holding. It was a balloon full of heroin.61 
Collins moved for the exclusion of this evidence because the Vancouver police officer 
subjected her to an unreasonable search and seizure contrary to her section 8 Charter 
right. The SCC found that the Crown had not proved reasonable grounds for the 
search and seizure of the evidence and considered its exclusion.
Justice Antonio Lamer (as he then was), writing for the majority of the Court 
in Collins, explained the purpose of the exclusionary rule as follows:
It is whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration 
o f justice into disrepute that is the applicable test. Misconduct by the police 
in the investigatory process often has some effect on the repute of the 
administration o f justice, but s. 24(2) is not a remedy for police misconduct, 
requiring the exclusion of the evidence if, because o f this misconduct, 
the administration o f justice was brought into disrepute. Section 24(2) 
could well have been drafted in that way, but it was not. Rather, the 
drafts o f the Charter decided to focus on the admission o f the evidence 
in the proceedings, and the purpose of s.24(2) is to prevent having the 
administration o f justice brought into further disrepute by the admission of 
the evidence in the proceedings. This further disrepute will result from the 
admission o f evidence that would deprive the accused of a fair hearing, or 
from judicial condonation of unacceptable conduct by the investigatory and 
prosecutorial agencies. It will also be necessary to consider any disrepute 
that may result from the exclusion o f the evidence....if its exclusion would 
bring the administration of justice into greater disrepute than would its 
admission. Finally, it must be emphasized that even though the inquiry 
under s.24(2) will necessarily focus on the specific prosecution, it is the 
long-term consequences o f regular admission or exclusion o f this type of 
evidence...which must be considered.62
The purpose of section 24(2) as understood by the Collins majority was 
to create a remedy which would protect the long-term repute of the justice system. 
Justice Lamer saw no basis to the idea that this remedy was created to punish the 
conduct of police officers or to grant a specific remedy to a particular accused. Rather, 
this is a remedy given to the community for a breach of the social contract between 
government and the governed. This interpretation of the exclusion clause was intended 
to affirm institutional and fundamental social values.63 Justice Lamer recognized that 
by the time the court considers offering this remedy the reputation of the justice
61 Ibid at paras 1-6.
62 Ibid at para 31.
63 Evidence and the Charter, supra note 17 at 268.
system has already been damaged. The test laid out in Collins also acknowledged that 
there will be disrepute brought on the justice system whether evidence is included or 
excluded. The trial judge is to examine in the particular context of the case before the 
court which of these two options would bring the least future disrepute upon the justice 
system.
Justice Lamer characterized this test as imposing a lower threshold for 
exclusion than the “community shock” test accepted by the Court in its pre-Charter 
decisions.64 He stated that this must be the case because a violation of the Charter is 
a violation of the most important law of the land.65 Examining the text of both the 
English and French versions of section 24(2), Lamer explained that evidence should 
be excluded even where it would only “tend” to bring justice into disrepute.66
In Collins, the majority of the court laid out factors which determined whether 
admitting evidence could bring the justice system into disrepute. These include the 
kind of evidence obtained, the seriousness of the Charter violation, the importance 
of the evidence to the Crown’s case, the seriousness of the offense, and whether there 
are other remedies available. The SCC acknowledged in Collins that trial fairness is 
key to the repute of the Canadian justice system. If the requirement of a fair trial is not 
met, the Court in Collins held there is a presumptive requirement to exclude evidence:
If the admission of the evidence in some way affects the fairness of the trial, 
then the admission of evidence would tend to bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute and, subject to a consideration of the other factors, 
the evidence generally should be excluded....However, the situation is 
very different with respect to cases where, after a violation of the Charter, 
the accused is conscripted against himself through a confession or other 
evidence emanating from him. The use of such evidence would render the 
trial unfair, for it did not exist prior to the violation and it strikes at one of 
the fundamental tenets of a fair trial, the right against self-incrimination ...
The use of self-incriminating evidence obtained following a denial of the 
right to counsel will...generally go to the very fairness of a trial and should 
generally be excluded.67
The Court’s concern with conscripted self-incrimination, as laid out in 
the above passage from Collins, reached its zenith ten years later in the ruling R v 
Stillman.68 On 12 April 1991, the accused, William Stillman, was consuming alcohol 
and drugs at a camp in the woods outside Oromocto, New Brunswick. Stillman left
64 Rothman, supra note 35.
65 Collins, supra note 60 at para 42.
66 Ibid at para 43.
67 Ibid at paras 36, 37.
68 [1997] 1 SCR 607 [Stillman].
the camp with a 14-year-old girl, whose body police later discovered below a train 
bridge near to the camp. When she was discovered, the victim had a human bite mark 
on her abdomen and semen was found in her vagina. The cause of her death was a 
wound or wounds to the head. When Stillman returned home that evening, he had mud 
and grass on his pants and a cut above one eye. He claimed to have been in a fight 
with five people. A week after the girl’s body was discovered, Stillman was arrested 
for murder. Stillman’s lawyer specifically refused a request of the police to collect 
physical evidence and said his client was not to speak to police without a lawyer 
present. Police ignored these directions and, under threat of force, collected hair from 
Stillman’s head and pubic area and made a dental impression of his teeth. They had 
no statutory authority to collect this physical evidence. The police then interrogated 
Stillman for an hour, during which time Stillman said nothing but cried throughout. 
When Stillman left the interrogation cell sobbing, he blew his nose on a tissue and 
discarded it into the trash. Police collected the tissue he used and submitted that tissue 
for DNA analysis, along with the hair samples. Stillman was arrested and found guilty 
of murder at trial.69 The SCC, in a 7-2 decision, found that a new trial was warranted 
and excluded all evidence, save for the abandoned tissue.
Writing for the majority in Stillman, Justice Peter Cory elaborated upon the 
three key considerations from Collins used in determining when to exclude evidence: 
its impact upon the fairness of the trial, the seriousness of the Charter violation related 
to its creation/discovery, and the possibility that excluding the evidence could bring the 
system of justice into disrepute.70 In particular, Justice Cory focused on the concept 
of trial fairness as the major determinant of whether evidence should be excluded. He 
stated:
A fair trial for those accused o f a criminal offence is a cornerstone o f our 
Canadian democratic society. A conviction resulting from an unfair trial is 
contrary to our concept o f justice ... The concept o f trial fairness must then 
be carefully considered for the benefit o f society as well as for an accused 
... The primary aim and purpose o f considering the trial fairness factor in 
the s.24(2) analysis is to prevent an accused person whose Charter rights 
have been infringed from being forced or conscripted to provide evidence 
in the form of statements or bodily samples for the benefit of the state.
It is because the accused is compelled as a result o f a Charter breach ... 
that the admission o f that evidence would generally tend to render the trial 
unfair.
It is repugnant to fair-minded men and women ... that police can without 
consent or statutory authority take or require an accused to provide parts of 
their body or bodily substances in order to incriminate themselves.71
69 Ibid at paras 2-15.
70 Ibid at para 69.
71 Ibid at paras 72, 73, 89.
Justice Cory rejected the idea that “real” evidence will always fall into the 
“non-conscriptive” category. Rather, if the accused is compelled by police to make 
a statement or provide a bodily substance in violation of Charter standards this 
evidence is of a conscriptive nature. In Stillman, the real evidence was of probative 
value and the manner in which it was collected in no way rendered it any less accurate. 
It speaks for itself independent of any conscription of the accused. However, Justice 
Cory dissolved the long-held distinction between real and testimonial evidence in 
expanding the court’s view of self-incrimination. He emphasized that the Crown must 
make its own case without taking bodily samples absent a warrant scheme that was 
designed to be minimally invasive to the rights of the accused. No warrant scheme 
existed to support the actions of police in taking evidence from Stillman’s body. 
Justice Cory also affirmed the rule of discoverability; where evidence is discovered as 
a consequence of information collected during an illegal interrogation, that evidence 
will only be admitted at trial if the Crown can prove police could have found this 
evidence without having to breach a Charter right. This discoverability exception was 
a limited compromise intended to prevent the criminally accused from pre-emptively 
dumping evidence on police in advance of police giving the criminally accused a 
reading of his or her Charter right to counsel.72
In her concurring judgment, Justice McLachlin (as she then was) foreshadowed 
her position in Grant while criticizing the Stillman majority for its elaboration upon 
the Collins framework. She laid out three criticisms:
First, it runs counter to the spirit and wording o f s.24(2), which requires 
that judges in all cases balance all factors which may affect the repute of 
the administration o f justice, and elevates the factor of trial unfairness to 
a dominant and in many cases conclusive status. Second, it rests on an 
expanded and, with respect, erroneous concept o f self-incrimination or 
conscription which equates any non-consensual participation by or use of 
the accused’s body in evidence gathering with trial unfairness. Third, it 
erroneously assumes that anything that affects trial fairness automatically 
renders the trial so fundamentally unfair that other factors can never 
outweigh the unfairness, with the result that it becomes unnecessary to 
consider the other factors.73
Justice McLachlin argued that trial fairness exists on a sliding scale, and that 
society’s interest in a trial on the merits should be considered in deciding whether to 
exclude any probative evidence.74 As will be discussed below, this critique of Stillman 
forms the essence of the majority’s ruling in Grant.
72 Ibid at para 106.
73 Ibid at para 250.
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In the wake of the Stillman expansion of conscripted evidence as including 
some real evidence, trial judges began applying Stillman in a fashion which 
presumptively excluded large amounts of real evidence without it first meeting the 
more thorough legal scrutiny imposed upon real but otherwise non-conscriptive 
evidence. In trying to exclude the “fruit of the poisoned tree”, courts expanded a 
sphere of protection to the accused beyond the original purpose of 24(2). Examining 
the history, the rule was created to prevent the abuse of state power as demonstrated in 
Wray. Non-discoverable conscripted evidence and forced confessions were to have no 
place in Canadian trials. By creating a wide and uncertain definition of conscription, 
Justice Cory’s judgment in Stillman was applied in a manner which ignored the plain 
text of the exclusion provision of the Charter and muddied the waters. Judges are 
obliged to consider “in all the circumstances” whether the evidence would tend to 
bring the justice system into disrepute before excluding it. Though the short-hand 
category of “conscripted evidence” made the legal analysis simpler, it also motivated 
defence counsel to see that all probative real evidence collected in breach of Charter 
standards was categorised as being conscripted from the accused.
In effect, Stillman made even the most trivial conscriptive act very relevant 
to the trial judge’s decision to exclude probative, real evidence. Imagine a situation 
where a police officer arrests a male suspect on suspicion of drug dealing. The police 
officer fails to give the accused a reading of his right to counsel. The police officer 
then does one of two things. In the first scenario the police officer orders the accused 
to show her what the accused has in his pocket. The accused pulls out a baggie full of 
methamphetamines. This evidence is considered conscripted because the accused is 
asked to participate in the Crown’s search for evidence and it is presumptively excluded. 
In the second scenario the police officer reaches into the pocket of the accused and 
discovers the baggie of drugs. This is labelled non-conscripted real evidence. The 
conscripted evidence is presumptively excluded, while the non-conscripted evidence 
is not. This imagined application of Stillman demonstrates how the test tended to 
ignore the seriousness of the breach upon the criminally accused’s Charter rights. If 
police had improperly strip-searched the criminally accused, then this invasive state 
action would have a serious effect upon the core right to privacy granted by section 8 
of the Charter, when a police officer directs the criminally accused to show her what 
is in his pocket, this has a relatively trivial effect upon his right to counsel. Regardless, 
evidence collected from a police-ordered strip search would have to survive more 
thorough legal scrutiny than evidence collected in the conscriptive scenario described 
above in order to be excluded
Queen’s University professor Don Stuart anticipated the coming reform 
to the section 24(2) exclusion remedy in his 2008 article, “Charter Standards for 
Investigative Powers: Have the Courts Got the Balance Right?”75 Other academics and
75 Printed in Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulous, eds, The Charter and Criminal Justice: Twenty-Five 
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jurists joined Stuart in complaining that the near-automatic exclusion of the overbroad 
category of conscripted evidence was leading to unacceptable results at trial. In 2005, 
Justice Louis LeBel in his dissent in R v Orbanski signalled that the intemperance of 
the legal community had not gone unnoticed by the SCC:
It is likely that few Charter provisions have generated so much academic 
comment, conflicting jurisprudential developments, media rhetoric or just 
plain uneasiness as s.24(2). Since the Charter came into force, our Court 
has returned on many occasions to the interpretation and application o f this 
provision. It has developed and refined methods o f analysis and application.
Despite all these efforts, doubts and misunderstandings remain. They 
arise mostly from views which attempt to read into the jurisprudence of 
our Court the creation o f an exclusionary rule in the case of conscripted 
evidence... The creation and application of a rule, based on a presumption 
that conscriptive evidence necessarily affects the fairness o f a trial, of 
almost automatic exclusion whenever such evidence is involved might be 
viewed as a clear and effective method to manage aspects o f the criminal 
trial. Nevertheless, our Court has never adopted such a rule, which could 
not be reconciled with the structure and the wording o f s.24(2).76
In response to Justice LeBel’s opinion in Orbanski, Canada’s trial judges 
started treating both conscripted and non-conscripted evidence in the same fashion. 
The presumption was that neither type of evidence would automatically render a trial 
unfair. As a consequence, all evidence had to pass through the full scrutiny of the 
Collins/Stillman test.77
While the SCC was working on the Grant decision, Don Stuart argued that 
the division between conscripted and non-conscripted evidence first discussed by 
Chief Justice Lamer in Collins and re-affirmed by Justice Cory in Stillman must be 
dissolved. Stuart believed that the confusion was rooted in Justice Cory’s approach 
to defining conscription. In one breath, Justice Cory defined conscriptive evidence 
as including any evidence produced where an accused is “compelled to participate 
in the creation or discovery of the evidence.”78 In the next breath, Justice Cory 
wrote of a more categorical approach to defining conscription, including compelled 
incrimination “by means of a statement, the use of the body or the production of 
bodily samples.”79 Additionally, Stuart objected to the “doctrine of discoverability” 
where evidence could only be considered at trial if the police could have otherwise 
found the evidence without breaching the Charter rights of the accused. To uncover 
whether evidence is discoverable, the court must enter into a speculative process as
76 R v Orbanski, 2005 SCC 37, [2005] 2 SCR 3 at paras 87, 98.
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to whether police could have eventually found the evidence. Stuart believed the focus 
on discoverability allowed the court to excuse the seriousness of the state’s breach 
of the criminally accused’s Charter right where discoverability was inevitable. This 
exception distracted from the illegal, bad faith actions of police officers. Stuart argued 
that this inappropriate distinction would become immediately superfluous if the 
conscripted and non-conscripted categories were abandoned. He hoped instead for a 
test which would put greater emphasis on the seriousness of the Charter breach and on 
the goal of deterring police misconduct.80
In Grant, the Court found an appropriate case for reframing the analysis of the 
section 24(2) remedy. Donnohue Grant was arrested by Toronto police on 17 November 
2003, and was subsequently charged with a number of firearms offences. Two plain 
clothes officers patrolling an area near a number of public schools detained Grant for 
walking in a way they considered to be suspicious. The two plain clothes officers were 
joined by a uniformed officer who asked Grant if he was carrying anything they should 
know about. During the course of police questioning, Grant admitted he was carrying 
a small amount of marijuana and a loaded firearm.81 Grant was not given a reading of 
his rights before answering the questions of the officers.
In its ruling, the SCC decided that Grant’s Charter right against arbitrary 
detention was violated by the officers. The majority said Grant reasonably believed 
he was obliged to speak to police, to follow instructions, and to answer questions 
honestly. His testimony and the derivative physical evidence taken off his person 
would have been excluded under Justice Cory’s analysis from Stillman. However, 
the Court rejected the Stillman approach and came up with a new way to determine 
when evidence should be excluded. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Charron, 
writing for the majority of the Court, ruled that the police officers were acting in an 
arena of considerable legal uncertainty with regard to whether they had detained Grant 
and thus would need to offer him access to counsel before questioning him further. 
Because of this uncertainty, the majority held that the police demonstrated no bad 
faith. Further, the majority held that the public had an interest in seeing Grant tried 
on the merits. McLachlin and Charron ruled that the evidence should not be excluded 
from consideration at trial, but Grant was acquitted from weapons charges because his 
conduct did not meet the definition of the offense.
In reframing the guiding test for section 24(2), the Court in Grant laid 
out three factors to be considered in deciding when to exclude otherwise probative 
evidence from a criminal trial:
80 Stuart: Balance, supra note 75 at 48-53.
81 Grant, supra note 2 at para 7.
(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct (admission may 
send the message the justice system condones serious state misconduct), (2) 
the impact o f the breach on the Charter-protected interests o f the accused 
(admission may send the message that individual rights count for little), and
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.82
The first factor of the Grant test directs trial judges to examine whether there 
are systemic or individual police practices which the court should not condone in 
accepting evidence at trial.83 This factor is not created to punish police behaviour, but 
is meant to give a positive guide to police on when their conduct could lead to the 
exclusion of evidence. The more severe or deliberate the state conduct that led to the 
Charter violation, the greater the obligation of the court to disassociate itself from this 
conduct.84 This factor raises questions regarding both the importance of the connection 
between the breach and the evidence arising from the breach, and also the question of 
what constitutes a “good faith” effort from police in carrying out their duties.
As stated by Chief Justice Brian Dickson in R v Strachan, so long as the 
evidence is collected in part of the “chain of events during which a Charter violation 
occurred” it can be excluded.85 A strict “but for” standard of proof that the Charter 
violation led to the discovery of evidence was not necessary; defence counsel need 
only prove that evidence was found within the chain of events involving the breach. 
This is appropriate, since the bulk of the evidence surrounding the actual breach of 
the criminally accused’s Charter rights will be controlled by those representatives of 
the state who breached the rights. This relaxes the evidentiary standard required of 
the criminally accused in proving that the Charter breach created the evidence used 
against him or her. In Grant, the Court focuses upon the police misconduct causing the 
breach in its decision to exclude. If there is little evidence that the conduct of the police 
officer directly led to the breach, there is less motivation for the court to dissociate 
itself from the act, placing a greater onus on defence counsel to prove this connection 
and diminishing the value of the rule from Strachan.
The Grant majority fails to give lower courts proper guidelines in determining 
whether police have demonstrated good faith in executing their duties. Rather, the 
Court chose to define bad faith. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Charron said that 
unless a police officer is operating in a sphere of legal uncertainty, that officer must be 
presumed to know proper procedure and have a fulsome understanding of the law.86 
Therefore, if an officer acts outside of the law that officer is deemed to be acting in
82 Ibid at para 71.
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bad faith. This favours excluding the evidence. By failing to define what constitutes 
good faith, this leaves open the question of when an officer is acting in a manner that 
is above reproach. It also leaves trial judges with the unchecked presumption that 
officers are ordinarily acting with good faith.
In its second factor, the Grant majority presents a good standard for evaluating 
all of the relevant circumstances in determining whether to exclude evidence under 
section 24(2). In examining the impact of the Charter breach, the Court examines 
whether the core right has been infringed in deciding if the breach is serious and 
therefore favouring exclusion.87 This means that the court will favour exclusion where 
a person is ordered under threat of force to strip in the street, but is less likely to do so 
when a police officer reaches into the half-opened backpack of the accused to discover 
evidence. It likely also means that where inconsequential conscription has taken place, 
it will not be treated as of overwhelming importance.
In its third factor, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Charron create an 
indefinite and frustrating lever for the exclusion or inclusion of evidence which 
will most likely become a selectively used tool weighing in favour of inclusion. In 
determining society’s interest in the adjudication of a case on its merits, the majority 
“asks whether the truth-seeking function of the criminal trial process would be better 
served by admission of the evidence, or by its exclusion.”88 This inquiry is meant to 
consider society’s interest in seeing a criminal brought to trial and dealt with according 
to the law. The more reliable the evidence, the stronger the perceived public interest 
in seeing it admitted at trial.89 The more important the evidence is to the Crown’s case, 
the more likely it is to be included at trial. The Court also states that the seriousness of 
the offense is not a major factor in deciding when to exclude evidence.90
This third factor raises two immediate criticisms. The first is that a serious 
breach of a Charter right is rendered less valuable to the accused based upon the 
Crown’s assertion as to how reliable the evidence is and how important it is to 
their case. This inserts the Crown’s motives to include the evidence too close to the 
judge’s mind and further creates an unfortunate distinction based on the kind of crime 
allegedly committed by the criminally accused. In the prosecution of complex white- 
collar crimes, it is rare that a single piece of evidence will be the lynchpin. Meanwhile, 
the smoking gun is always at the heart of a murder trial. The second problem with this 
test is that it is beyond the ability of defence counsel to refute a claim that there is a 
“public interest” in any trial upon its merits, let alone when a criminally accused faces
87 Ibid at para 76.
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sanction for a serious offense. Ultimately, it is unsatisfactory to have so convenient an 
option to ignore a severe breach of a Charter right.
The less immediate but no less disconcerting problem with the overall 
structure of the three-part test from Grant is that in abandoning trial fairness and the 
related concept of non-discoverability as standards for exclusion, Grant may upset 
both the balance of power between the Crown and the criminally accused and between 
the Crown and the judiciary. In his robust development of the right to counsel and the 
pre-trial right to silence, we can see Chief Justice Lamer making inroads to control 
police conduct.91 This created a conflict with the Crown’s ability to direct its case, and 
some would suggest these judicial powers should be narrowed. In his work for the Law 
Reform Commission during the 1970s, Commissioner Lamer joined other authors in 
justifying the creation of procedures favourable to the criminally accused “as a check 
on the otherwise limitless powers of the state, its institutions and officials.”92 Judges 
are now more dependent upon Crown prosecutors in deciding when to assert their 
authority over these pre-trial matters and thus the Crown’s power is enlarged.
Chief Justice Lamer also saw it as essential to the administration of justice 
that the trial judge have a broad discretion to exclude evidence from consideration if 
it might taint the reputation of justice.93 His goal at both the Law Reform Commission 
and the SCC was to replace the common law rule in Wray which denied the existence 
of a trial judge’s exclusionary discretion.94 As Chief Justice Lamer said in an address 
to St. Louis University some two weeks after the SCC ruled on Stillman:
It is, in my opinion, sound theory to stipulate that we will admit or exclude 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence on the basis of how it affects respect 
for criminal justice. ... Where the Charter breach is particularly serious 
such as in the case of a bad faith and highly intrusive body cavity search, 
that consideration would tend to outweigh the other factors [from Collins] 
regardless of whether the evidence obtained was purely real evidence or if  
the evidence was essential to substantiate the charge.
However, there were signs of one fairly rigid rule developing in the 
aftermath o f Collins in the lower courts. Where the Court determined on 
the basis of the nature o f the evidence that its submission [sic] would render 
the trial unfair under the first ruling, the sense emerged that the conclusion 
could not be undone by reference to the other two sets of factors. Here, the 
fluidity was lost.
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While Chief Justice Lamer acknowledged that the idea of trial fairness need 
not always take supremacy or operate in an absolute fashion, he certainly understood 
that trial fairness protects the accused from state abuse by way of forced self- 
incrimination.95 Trial fairness has been accepted by the Court as fundamental to our 
criminal justice system.96 The Court in Grant recognized that trial fairness remains an 
“overarching systemic goal”, but elected to treat trial fairness as an abstract, untenable 
standard of analysis under section 24(2).97 By doing so, the Court has incidentally 
undermined the obligation upon the state to bring its own case to meet, and all of 
the other corollaries of trial fairness developed under the Collins/Stillman test. The 
Collins/Stillman framework, for all its practical problems, had trial fairness as its 
reasonable underlying logic and this helped safeguard these checks on state power.
As shown by the choices of Parliament, the Law Reform Commission, and 
the Supreme Court of Canada under Chief Justice Lamer, the essential purpose of 
section 24(2) is to protect the administration of justice from disrepute caused by 
police misconduct. It was created to prevent police from conscripting the criminally 
accused, like John Wray, into participating in his or her own criminal conviction. The 
discoverability of real, probative evidence and the onus it placed upon the Crown was 
an appropriate limit upon state power and simultaneously respected the truth-seeking 
function of the court. While the Court’s focus upon bad faith policing will support 
the public acceptability of verdicts, trial fairness should have remained the primary 
focus for this remedy. Trial fairness provided an appropriate guide for trial judges in 
deciding when to correct an imbalance or abuse of state power by excluding evidence 
when it precluded the obligation of the state to bear the onus of proving its own case.
In its new test the Grant majority gives trial judges too broad a discretion to 
choose when to give a section 24(2) remedy. As will be seen, the new test set out in 
Grant has created obstacles for defendants attempting to obtain a fair trial and has led 
to uneven results.
♦ ♦ ♦
The SCC’s goal in Grant is to guide trial judges in how to balance “all the 
circumstances of the case” in deciding whether to execute or reserve the Charter 
exclusion remedy.98 The proper balance must be struck among society’s competing 
interests in proper police respect for the Charter, an individual’s Charter protected 
rights including the idea of a zone of privacy and the adjudication of criminal trials on 
their merits. However, as Don Stuart suggests in his evaluation of the cases discussed
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below, this revision of the section 24(2) jurisprudence hasn’t yet offered sufficient 
clarity to those who are applying Grant to the facts presented at trial."
In the 2009 decision, R v Campbell,100 the ambiguity of the Court’s definition 
of police “good faith” creates considerable difficulty for the Superior Court of Ontario. 
Additionally, in deciding whether the public has an interest in seeing a trial on the 
merits, the trial judge in Campbell gives considerable weight to the seriousness of the 
criminal offence with which the accused is charged.
In 2006, Toronto police began investigating Andrew Campbell on suspicion 
that he was dealing drugs. Detective constable Rick St. Anand received a tip that a 
man named Campbell was dealing in crack, methamphetamine and marijuana and 
also that Campbell was in possession of three unlicensed hand guns. The detective 
constable found a police record for an Andrew Campbell that fit the description of the 
person identified by the tipster. This record included Campbell’s home address. St. 
Anand conducted a short surveillance of Campbell’s apartment building, but identified 
nothing that would raise a reasonable suspicion that Campbell was dealing in drugs. 
The detective constable wanted a warrant to seize weapons and drugs from Campbell’s 
apartment. Instead of following police procedure and appearing before a Justice of the 
Peace or using the tele-warrant system, St. Anand approached a judge who had earlier 
offered himself up to review the detective’s warrant requests. Police regulations did 
not permit St. Anand to get a warranted search in this way. The detective also failed to 
disclose information to the judge that surveillance of Campbell’s apartment had failed 
to yield any evidence of drug trade.
In ruling for the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Judge Frank Marrocco 
decided that the breach of Campbell’s right to privacy in his home was a serious one. 
However, Judge Marrocco ruled that despite failing to follow proper procedure in 
both obtaining and executing the warrant, the police had acted in good faith.101 In 
applying the exclusion remedy from Grant, Judge Marrocco split up the evidence 
discovered during the improperly warranted search of Campbell’s home. The court 
gave a section 24(2) remedy to exclude drugs seized from Campbell’s apartment, but 
refused to exclude the guns. Judge Marrocco ruled that society’s interest in seeing 
gun violence prosecuted was greater than that for drug possession. In effect, Judge 
Marrocco made a decision which deemed the seriousness of the offence relevant to 
the decision to exclude one set of evidence while admitting the other. To justify this
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decision he pointed to the authority of Harrison from the Grant trilogy stating that 
seriousness of the charges favours admitting the evidence.102
In Harrison, Chief Justice McLachlin speaking for the majority of the court 
does not explicitly reject the seriousness of the offense as a consideration. However, 
she does say that the same approach to exclusion should apply however serious the 
offence to be prosecuted:
[Allowing the seriousness o f the offence and the reliability of the evidence 
to overwhelm the s.24(2) analysis “would deprive those charged with 
serious crimes o f the protection o f the individual freedoms afforded to all 
Canadians under the Charter and, in effect, declare that in the administration 
of the criminal law ‘the ends justify the means’”... Additionally, the trial 
judge’s observation that the Charter breaches “pale in comparison to the 
criminality involved” in drug trafficking risked the appearance of turning 
the s. 24(2) inquiry into a contest between the misdeeds of the police and 
those o f the accused.103
The SCC intended to explicitly tell the lower courts that this kind of 
consideration should not be determinative. However, the holistic view of the new Grant 
test does make room for courts to give seriousness of the offence an inappropriate 
weight. The confusion about what constitutes “good faith” or “bad faith” is also at 
play in Campbell. It is hard to see why the finding of Detective Constable St. Anand’s 
carelessness didn’t lead to the exclusion of all evidence seized during the illegal search 
of Andrew Campbell’s apartment.104 The SCC saw a need to encourage exclusion not 
only where police have been deliberate or reckless in their Charter violations but also 
where they have acted in ignorance or in a careless fashion in breaching a right.
Meanwhile, Judge Kenneth Nielson of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench has 
come to the exact opposite conclusion from Campbell. In R v Goodwin, Judge Nielson 
found no “good faith” could save an unintended police Charter violation following an 
arbitrary detention and illegal search which resulted in the discovery of both drugs and 
a loaded rifle and hand-gun.105 Judge Nielson noted that he considered the Campbell 
ruling, but still came to the conclusion that a police failure to follow standards for 
investigatory detention and right to counsel warnings cannot be overwhelmed by the 
irrelevant public interest in prosecuting a weapons related offense.
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These two cases demonstrate the uncertainty of obtaining a section 24(2) 
exclusion remedy for a serious breach of a Charter right after Grant. At present, 
the remedy of exclusion appears to be the only satisfactory way to give effect to the 
extrinsic policy choices of Parliament embodied in the Charter sections protecting 
the procedural rights of the criminally accused. Canada’s courts are now searching 
for new ways to give meaningful remedy to Charter breaches where the exclusion of 
evidence or a stay of proceedings is not appropriate.
In its 2010 ruling, R v Nasogaluak, 106 the SCC examines a novel way in 
which the court may give some meaningful remedy for a Charter breach by making 
the breach relevant when determining the sentence imposed upon a guilty party. On 
12 May 2004, Lyle Nasogaluak was involved in a high-speed car chase with RCMP 
after police had been tipped off to the possibility that he was driving while drunk. After 
Nasogaluak brought his car to a stop he resisted police requests to exit his vehicle. 
While pulling him out of the car, one of the police officers at the scene punched him 
twice in the head. Then when he refused to be hand-cuffed both of the attending 
officers held him down. One punched him, breaking two of his ribs. When he was 
taken to the police station, Nasogaluak provided a breath sample that showed his blood 
alcohol level was high enough to deem him impaired. The officers did not report the 
physical force used in arresting the defendant. After spending a night in a holding cell, 
Nasogaluak checked himself into a hospital where doctors discovered that one of his 
lungs was perforated. He was admitted for emergency surgery.107
At trial, the judge accepted Nasogaluak’s guilty plea to charges for impaired 
driving and for fleeing from police. The judge found that Nasogaluak’s section 7 
Charter right to security of the person was breached and applied section 24(1) of the 
Charter in determining Nasogaluak’s sentence.108 He reduced Nasogaluak’s sentence 
to below the statutory minimum sentence for these crimes. At the Court of Appeal, 
the court set Nasogaluak’s sentence to the statutory minimum, and said that it was 
appropriate to consider the Charter breach when deciding a fit sentence.109
In delivering the judgement of the Court, Justice LeBel stated that a Charter 
breach should be considered when deciding, in the totality of the circumstances, 
what is a fit sentence.110 He said it was not useful to consider section 24(1) of the 
Charter in deciding how to set the sentence in this particular case, as the sentence itself 
accorded with Charter principles. However, Justice LeBel did say that in exceptional 
circumstances, a sentence reduction outside of the statutory limits may be appropriate,
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if it is the sole effective remedy for egregious conduct of state agents.111 In his dissent 
from the earlier ruling in R v Bjelland, Justice Morris Fish would have protected the 
trial judge’s wide discretion to create remedies under section 24(1). He said that trial 
judges should still retain the right to create remedies to prevent a trial being rendered 
unfair for the accused.112
As it was originally drafted, section 24 of the Charter was intended to 
simply offer up declarations that separated the court from the poor conduct of state 
actors who illegally obtained evidence through a breach of the Charter rights of a 
criminally accused. This position was rejected in later drafts of the Charter. While 
Grant does bring the test for Charter exclusion closer to the literal text of section 
24(2), the history of the Charter should indicate to Canada’s courts that a simple 
declaration will not be a sufficient remedy for a serious Charter breach. This is why 
the remedy of exclusion should be understood as only a subset of those remedies the 
Court should consider under its section 24 review. A range of remedies are needed in 
order to rein in government abuse and also to avoid the inappropriate reliance by trial 
judges upon section 24(2) exclusion when some other remedy would better serve the 
situation. The Court must strive to find an effective remedy for those breaches where 
evidentiary exclusion is inappropriate; in order to protect the value of human dignity 
which the Court has acknowledged underlies all of the rights granted by the Charter, 
such remedies must exist.113 Until the Court finds a way to preserve these core societal 
values enshrined within the Charter, the truth will continue to cost too much.
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